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 During the last three decades, political 
science and history have been mostly 
interested in the processes of the transition 
and consolidation of democracies. 
The reverse, the trajectories to 
authoritarianism, although not neglected, 
have been less popular. This reflected the 
prevailing optimism of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, when it was held that liberal 
democracy had become the only model of 
political, social and economic order. 
Before the coming of the liberal 
tide, apart from interwar Fascism and 
National Socialism, it was a specific 
type of reversion to authoritarianism 
that had caught the eye of political 
scientists and historians – military 
coups. Civic-military relations and the 
path to authoritarianism were the focus 
of attention of a distinguished political 
scientist, Samuel Huntington. In 1968 
he offered a compact approach of the 
underlying causes of military coups 
in the developing world.1 In contrast 
to what Walt Rostow had argued in 
1960,2 Huntington’s conclusion was 
that modernisation was not a motor 
1 Samuel Huntington, Political Order 
in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1968.
2 Walt Rostow, The Stages of Economic 
Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960.
of democratisation but a catalyst for 
authoritarianism, with the military as 
its principal agent. He explained that, in 
the context of traditional political orders, 
political institutions were weak and 
participation limited. The entry into the 
political arena of new social groups that 
sprang up as a result of a rapid process 
of economic and social transformation, 
or “modernisation”, as the sociology 
of development termed it, meant that 
the masses were mobilised to demand 
participation in the political arena. Along 
with the ruling oligarchies or monarchies, 
the middle classes, fragile and insecure as 
they were, felt threatened by the entry of 
the poor urban masses into the political 
process. In these circumstances, the army 
would frequently intervene in politics to 
serve as the custodian of order whereas 
in the early twentieth century the officer 
corps had facilitated the entry of the 
middle classes into the political system. 
However, in the 1970s in southern 
Europe, and later on during the 1980s 
in Latin America and, at the turn of the 
1980s to the 1990s with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, 
democracy spread all over the world. 
It was not only the southern European 
and the Latin American countries 
that, although “prone to instability 
and dictatorship”, escaped the grip of 
authoritarianism. It was also the former 
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Soviet Union and the people’s republics, 
the bloc that was the manifestation of 
an economic and political alternative to 
liberalism that had collapsed and opted 
for the western model of political and 
economic organisation. In the tune of 
the times, Huntington offered another 
sweeping account, this time of the 
process of democratisation, which was 
titled The Third Wave.3 It was indeed 
a representation of a tidal wave. The 
rise or expansion of the middle classes, 
the ideological preponderance of 
liberalism and the snowball effect that 
swept the globe after the completion of 
the first democratisations were factors 
that explained, in his view, this new 
movement towards democracy. 
The story though was far from over. 
As Haggard and Kaufman amplify, in this 
study that extends from 1980 to the early 
2010s, there were at least 25 “reversions” 
from democracy to authoritarianism. This 
reversion does not necessarily take the 
form of a coup but it is sort of “backsliding”, 
as the authors call it (219). It frequently 
involves democratically elected incumbents 
sidelining democratic processes and 
institutions. Quite often, it is a reaction of 
the ruling elites to mass mobilisation as 
they see their predominance and interests 
threatened from below. Beyond that, 
Haggard and Kaufman also identify a 
rather novel type of “populist reversion”, 
the seizure of power by the mobilisation 
of dissatisfaction. It involves lower groups, 
whose demands had been neglected within 
the framework of the regular functioning 
of democracies. Nevertheless, the authors 
3 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: De-
mocratization in the late Twentieth Century, 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
do not think that inequality is the prime 
cause of the reversion to authoritarianism. 
They identify the problem in the “weak 
democracy syndrome”. They do not deny 
that this syndrome reflects “institutional, 
administrative and fiscal weaknesses” that 
are associated with low per capita income. 
They think, nonetheless, that the primary 
cause for the reversion to authoritarianism 
is a weak civil society. 
Haggard and Kaufman’s work is 
commendable. The wealth of their 
sources is impressive, derived often 
from extensive databases which quantify 
various aspects of the political and 
institutional process in democratic and 
authoritarian regimes. Still, it is one 
thing to collect data and another to 
evaluate and interpret the material, and 
it is the latter which should primarily 
draw the attention of the historian or 
political scientist. Their assumptions 
and analysis display the restraint of 
political scientists with regard to the 
usefulness of class as a concept in in 
history and the social sciences. Haggard 
and Kaufman’s approach is quite 
different from that of great narrators 
like Barrington Moore,4 Huntington 
or Gregory Luebbert.5 Haggard and 
Kaufman’s hypothesis that explaining 
the reversion to authoritarianism mainly 
through the weakness of civil society 
is useful only in conjunction with an 
analysis that would take into account the 
4 Barrington Moore Jr, The Social Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy, Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1966.
5 Gregory Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism, or 
Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Po-
litical Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
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social origins of dissatisfaction and the 
support base of emerging authoritarian 
rulers. Bringing class and social forces 
at the epicentre of historical inquiry or 
political research would not necessarily 
involve a Marxist revival. Non-Marxist 
intellectuals of the calibre of Max Weber 
or Ralf Dahrendorf were receptive to 
class and social differentiation in their 
analyses and they clearly disassociated 
themselves from a crude reductionist 
approach. A careful examination of 
the most characteristic examples of 
authoritarian relapse such as Russia and 
Turkey or the endurance of political 
domination by an authoritarian structure 
like that of China would showcase the 
utility of linking the concept of a weak 
civil society to the social dimension 
of politics. In each of these cases, civil 
society was indeed weak as it lacked the 
historical depth, cultural resources and 
institutional autonomy to withstand 
the pressures emanating from the state. 
But at the same time, Putin’s power base 
within state institutions, the parliament, 
the public and the private sectors of 
the economy; Erdogan’s moderate 
Islamist Justice and Development Party; 
and the Communist Party of China 
secured legitimacy for regimes with 
these authoritarian underpinnings 
by accommodating or favouring the 
emergence of a wide enough middle 
class that was rather satisfied with its 
actual living standards and prospects. It 
is impossible to understand Erdogan’s 
rule if the only point of reference is weak 
civil society; the mass of Anatolian, 
pious, lower middle-class adherents to 
his party cannot be disregarded. A case 
in point is also the tolerance enjoyed by 
the Communist Party in China, which is 
secured by a combination of widespread 
prosperity and the links between the 
business elites and the party. 
Overall, the concept of a weak civil society 
is useful as it brings into our analysis the 
importance of political culture, traditions 
and institutional practices that burden 
a democratic polity. At the same time, 
this concept is inadequate to explain the 
social divisions and political polarisation 
that underline acute conflicts that lead 
to the erosion of the democratic process 
and provide the context for the relapse to 
authoritarianism.
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